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31 March 1959

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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*USSR: Moscow's prompt replies to the Western notes of 26 March reflect Khrushchev's belief that the West is substantially committed to holding a summit meeting regardless of the outcome of a preliminary foreign ministers' conference. The Soviet notes seek to create the impression that the three Western powers and the USSR have already agreed to both a foreign ministers' conference and a summit meeting. Khrushchev's apparent desire not to obstruct the convening of a ministerial conference by insisting on the participation of Poland and Czechoslovakia at the outset is evident in Moscow's willingness to have this question decided by the conference itself. While the Soviet notes indicate agreement to Western proposals on the date, place, and agenda of a conference of foreign ministers, the reference to the Soviet note of 2 March suggests that the USSR will insist that substantive discussions be confined to a German peace treaty and the Berlin question.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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*India Tibet: Prime Minister Nehru in his statement on Tibet before an aroused Parliament on 30 March appeared to balance his expression of sympathy for the rebels with a re-affirmation of India's desire for friendly relations with Communist China. Nehru sharply rejected Peiping's charges that Indian parliamentary discussions of the Tibetan situation were "impolite" and that the revolt was directed from Indian territory. Indian political groups and many newspapers are intensifying their pressure on the government to take an unequivocal stand against Chinese repression in Tibet. [Tibetan resistance leaders based in India on 28 March apparently were planning an immediate appeal to Nehru for recognition of a Tibetan Provisional Government," for asylum for refugees, and for diplomatic and material assistance to the rebel movement. The Dalai Lama's party was expected to reach the Indian border on 31 March.]

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Japan: The decision of the Tokyo district court to acquit seven Japanese nationals of trespassing on an American air base and its opinion that the presence of foreign troops in Japan is unconstitutional may make it more difficult for Kishi to effect an early revision of the US-Japanese security treaty. The opposition Socialists almost certainly will exploit it in their nationwide campaign against revision of the treaty, and this could lead to renewed incidents at US bases. The Japanese Government intends to appeal the decision, which in the interim will have no practical effect on the status of US forces in Japan.

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DAILY BRIEF

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OK Greece: EDA, the Communist-front party, apparently has reached agreement on at least limited cooperation in the 5 April nationwide municipal elections with Sophocles Venizelos, leader of the largest faction of the non-Communist Liberal party. In the last general elections EDA polled nearly 25 percent of the total vote and attracted a plurality in some large urban areas. It stands to gain both political influence and greater respectability through cooperation with the Venizelos wing of the Liberals.)

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OK Cyprus: Archbishop Makarios, who previously has sought to promote a modus vivendi between right- and left-wing Greek Cypriots through a tacit understanding with the Communists, now has agreed to support moves to weaken the Communist-dominated labor federation on Cyprus. A period of labor unrest, may result and could lead to an end of the political truce within the Greek Cypriot community.

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III. THE WEST

MO France: Paris believes the West should try to put the USSR on the defensive by following up De Gaulle's public suggestion for a joint aid program attacking basic human problems in underdeveloped countries. The French Government may soon propose that a number of Western nations develop a program for Africa as a whole analogous to De Gaulle's plan for Algerian economic development.

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DAILY BRIEF

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oh Argentina: In calling a general strike for 3 April, the Peronistas and Communists are renewing strong pressure on President Frondizi to lift the state of siege and take steps which would enable them to regain control of a large segment of organized labor. Although politically motivated, the strike call may find considerable support because of widespread discontent over high living costs and require firm police and military control measures.

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DAILY BRIEF

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
(No Back-up Material)

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Indian Reaction to Tibetan Situation

The Indian Government apparently is finding it increasingly difficult to maintain its official position of friendship toward Communist China in the face of increasing pressure from political groups and many newspapers to take a less equivocal stand on the Tibetan situation.

Prime Minister Nehru, in his statement before a tense Parliament on 30 March, adhered to his established policy of non-interference. His expression of sympathy for the Tibetan rebels was balanced by a reaffirmation of India's desire for friendly relations with Peiping. However, in sharply rejecting the Chinese allegation that discussion of Tibet in the Indian Parliament was "impolite," Nehru made it clear that he would countenance no limitations on parliamentary debate "by any external or internal authority."

Several non-Communist opposition parties now are actively agitating along anti-Chinese lines as expressed in much of the press during the past week, thus intensifying pressure on the government to condemn Peiping for its suppression of the resistance movement. Despite demands even among progovernment newspapers for a "realistic reassessment of the basis of our foreign policy," however, New Delhi is unlikely to deviate markedly from its policy of outward conciliation with Peiping. Nehru apparently is willing, as on past occasions, to let the press and opposition elements express the stronger and more representative views which he feels his government cannot officially endorse.

[The Dalai Lama's party was expected to reach the Indian border on 31 March, probably en route to the large lamasery at Tawang in Assam--the first center inside Indian territory on the route from Tibet. Tibetan resistance leaders based in India on 28 March apparently were planning an immediate appeal to Nehru for recognition of a "Tibetan Provisional Government," for asylum for the Dalai Lama and other refugees, and for diplomatic and material assistance to the rebel movement. While New Delhi reportedly is ready to extend political asylum to the Dalai Lama and some refugees, it may try to ease the diplomatic problem posed by their presence by restricting Tibetan activities to nonpolitical affairs and limiting its overt support of the resistance movement.]

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Japanese Court Declares Presence of US Troops in Japan
Unconstitutional

The Tokyo district court's opinion that the presence of foreign troops in Japan is unconstitutional may make it more difficult for Prime Minister Kishi to effect an early revision of the US-Japanese security treaty. Since the government plans to appeal the decision it will have no immediate effect on the legal status of US forces in Japan. It could, however, involve the Kishi government in an undesirable political controversy prior to the parliamentary elections in early June. It also gives added impetus to a nationwide Socialist campaign against revision of the security treaty.

In its action, the district court acquitted seven Japanese nationals accused of trespassing on an American air base in 1957. There is the possibility that incidents similar to that for which the seven were arrested--i.e., breaking down the fence surrounding Tachikawa air base in protest against its expansion--may be repeated. Left-wing labor and student groups, with Socialist encouragement, would be particularly prone to such action.

In declaring the presence of foreign troops unconstitutional, the district court cited article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the maintenance of an "army, navy, air force, and other war potential." The Japanese Government, in maintaining a limited military establishment, has interpreted this provision most liberally on the premise that every country has the inherent right to provide for its own defense, but it has avoided a legal test on this point. The court's decision could lead to additional juridical action on the entire question of military forces in Japan. A Foreign Ministry official has indicated that the government will appeal the decision.

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Greek Elections

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[The United Democratic Left (EDA), legal front for the proscribed Communist party of Greece, is trying to make the municipal elections scheduled for 5 April a test of the pro-Western government's popularity.]

[EDA leaders are seeking collaboration of non-Communist opposition parties in sponsoring joint slates of candidates for the municipal councils. While EDA has been rebuffed by spokesmen for several minor nationalist opposition parties, it apparently has achieved some success with Liberal leader Sophocles Venizelos.]

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[This co-operation, even if not effective in the council elections, may become evident in the subsequent election of mayors by the councilors.]

[Venizelos, however, is spokesman for only one faction of the rapidly deteriorating Liberal party. Several prominent Liberals have denounced collaboration with EDA and are working with other nationalist leaders to defeat the Communists. This grouping may hold the balance of power in some cities if the elections result in approximately equal distribution of council seats between EDA and the government.]

[The government favors holding "nonpolitical" elections, --emphasizing candidates rather than parties--apparently for fear that EDA, which captured 25 percent of the popular vote in the general elections in May 1958, has continued to gain strength among the electorate. EDA will probably gain new respectability from its association with the Venizelos wing of the Liberals. It will take credit for the victories of several non-Communist candidates and will probably increase its representation in local governments throughout Greece.]

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Labor Contest May Disrupt Political Truce on Cyprus

Leaders of the conservative Cyprus Confederation of Workers (SEK) assert that Archbishop Makarios has agreed to support their efforts to increase their membership at the expense of the Pan Cyprian Federation of Labor (PEO), the island's largest union and a bulwark of Communist strength. Apparently Makarios is counting on the Communists' desire for legislative representation to keep them from breaking the political truce among Greek Cypriots in retaliation against attacks on PEO. Recently it was reported that in return for PEO leader Andreas Ziartides' agreement not to contest elections for an independent Cyprus, Makarios promised the Communists a guaranteed proportion--possibly as much as 25 percent--of the seats assigned to the Greek Cypriots.

Now at the zenith of their prestige, the conservative Greek Cypriots are anxious to disorganize and weaken the Communists and leftists, who stand to gain in strength as the new government grapples with the political and economic problems of an independent Cyprus.

District leaders of the recently disbanded and disarmed EOKA paramilitary organization are being brought into the now-ineffectual SEK, and an official of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions will give them a six-week course in labor-union methods. While regional leaders are sorely needed, the danger exists that these former EOKA leaders will resort to strong-arm tactics and disrupt the present favorable security situation on Cyprus.

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III. THE WEST

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De Gaulle Wants Broad Cooperation to Aid Undeveloped Countries

[France may soon follow up De Gaulle's press statement of 25 March that he would welcome a summit discussion aimed at attacking the basic human problems of disease, hunger, and shelter. Premier Debré told Ambassador Houghton on 26 March that De Gaulle believes it important to introduce into the summit talks a topic broader than Berlin which would appeal to the peoples of the West and would put the USSR on the defensive.]

[De Gaulle has long felt that sooner or later the USSR would be obliged to cooperate with the West against the upsurge of nationalism among non-European peoples, particularly the Chinese. A recent article by Chief of Staff General Paul Ely in the French National Defense Review developed the idea that in another generation an "Americanized" Russia would need help to stave off Chinese expansion westward.]

[Debré tends to look on De Gaulle's plan for the economic development of Algeria as a prototype for undeveloped areas elsewhere. He feels that a great psychological advance has already been achieved by the plan, although its economic goals are long-range.]

[The French Government has increasingly encouraged foreign investment in France's dependencies, and some officials seem inclined to favor a joint Western economic development program for Africa as a whole.]

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General Strike in Argentina Called for 3 April

In calling a general strike for 3 April, the Peronistas and Communists are renewing strong pressure on Argentine President Frondizi to lift the state of siege and take steps which would enable Peronistas to regain control of a large segment of organized labor. Publicly, however, the strike leaders are emphasizing that wages are inadequate in relation to the rapid price rises since the US-backed austerity plan was initiated on 1 January.

Because of widespread discontent over the almost 40-percent increase in living costs this year, the anti-Peronista labor group is meeting to decide whether it must join the strike to avoid losing support among labor. Consequently some Argentine press sources believe the strike could assume the proportions of the general strike in mid-January, which resulted in the government's taking control of ten major unions, including the main Peronista strongholds and the three national unions led by Communists.

The armed forces strongly support a firm line toward labor and the Communists. They will probably be deployed to support the police in controlling any disturbances.

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